Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy

Free trade areas (FTAs) are arrangements among two or more countries under which they agree to eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers on trade in goods among themselves. However, each country maintains its own policies, including tariffs, on trade outside the region. In the last few years, the United States has engaged or has proposed to engage in negotiations to establish bilateral and regional free trade arrangements with a number of trading partners. Such arrangements are not new in U.S. trade policy. The United States has had a free trade arrangement with Israel since 1985 and with Canada since 1989, which was expanded to include Mexico and became the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) effective in January 1994. U.S. interest in bilateral and regional free trade arrangements surged, and the Bush Administration accelerated the pace of negotiations after the enactment of the Trade Promotion Authority in August 2002. U.S. participation in free trade agreements can occur only with the concurrence of Congress. In addition, FTAs affect the U.S. economy, with the impact varying across sectors. The 112th Congress and the Obama Administration faced the question of whether and when to act on three FTAs pending from the Bush Administration—with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Although the Bush Administration signed these agreements, it and the leaders of the 110th Congress could not reach agreement on proceeding to enact them. No action was taken during the 111th Congress either. After discussion with congressional leaders and negotiations with the governments of Colombia, Panama, and South Korea to assuage congressional concerns regarding treatment of union officials (Colombia), taxation regimes (Panama), and trade in autos (South Korea), President Obama submitted draft implementing legislation to Congress on October 3, 2011. The 112th Congress approved each of the bills in successive votes on October 12, along with legislation to renew an aspect of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. President Obama signed the bills into law on October 21, 2011. In the meantime, on November 14, 2009, President Obama committed to work with the current and prospective partners in the negotiations to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The TPP is a free trade agreement that includes nations on both sides of the Pacific. The TPP negotiations emerged from an FTA that included Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore and that entered into force in 2006. Besides the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Vietnam have joined the negotiations. Furthermore, the United States has been negotiating with the 28-member European Union to form the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). FTAs raise some important policy issues: Do FTAs serve or impede U.S. long-term national interests and trade policy objectives? Which type of an FTA arrangement meets U.S. national interests? What should U.S. criteria be in choosing FTA partners? Are FTAs a substitute for or a complement to U.S. commitments and interests in promoting a multilateral trading system via the World Trade Organization (WTO)? What effect will the expiration of TPA have on the future of FTAs as a trade policy strategy? FTAs as a trade policy strategy

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy

On July 1, 2007, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA—previously known as fast track) expired. TPA is the authority that Congress grants to the President to enter into certain reciprocal trade agreements, and to have the requisite implementing legislation considered under expedited legislative procedures. Although the President has the authority under the Constitution to negotiate international agreements, typically a reciprocal trade agreement requires an implementing bill and, therefore, congressional action to bring it into force. Many Members of Congress have advocated for renewal of TPA .On July 30, 2013, President Obama requested that Congress reauthorize TPA. On January 9, 2014, legislation to renew TPA—the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014—was introduced in the House (H.R. 3830) and in the Senate (S. 1900). The legislation would reauthorize TPA for four years with the possibility of a three-year extension. Alternative bills may also be introduced during the second session of the 113th Congress. Although there appears to be support for renewal of TPA in Congress, the details of the legislation are likely to be subject to considerable debate, including the specific treatment of any related TAA program reauthorization. This report presents background and analysis on the development of TPA, a summary of the major provisions under the expired authority, and a discussion of the issues that have arisen in the debate over TPA renewal. It also explores some of the policy options available to Congress

U.S. Foreign Trade in Services: Trends and U.S. Policy Challenges

[Excerpt] This report provides background information and analysis on U.S. foreign trade in services. The focus of the report is an analysis of the policy challenges that the United States confronts, especially the challenge of negotiating a set of international disciplines on trade in services and dealing with the complexity of measuring trade in services. The report also focuses on emerging issues and current negotiations, especially those pertaining to the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), formerly called fast track, is the authority Congress has granted to the President for limited periods of time to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. The authority lays out U.S. trade negotiating objectives, procedures for congressional-executive notification and consultation, and expedited legislative procedures under which bills implementing trade agreements negotiated by the executive branch are to be considered. The most recent authority was enacted in December 2002 and expired as of July 1, 2007. Legislation to reauthorize TPA has been introduced in the 113th Congress. The United States is engaged in several sets of trade agreement negotiations. The issue of TPA reauthorization has raised a number of questions regarding TPA itself and the pending legislation. This report addresses a number of those questions that are frequently asked, including: • What is trade promotion authority? • Is TPA necessary? • What are trade negotiating objectives and how are they reflected in TPA statutes? • What requirements does Congress impose on the President under TPA? • Does TPA affect congressional authority on trade policy

The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications

[Excerpt] On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean trade officials signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be the second-largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date, after the agreement with the European Union (EU). It would be the second-largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the seventhlargest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea’s third-largest trading partner. Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have substantial economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. The agreement will not enter into force unless Congress approves implementation legislation. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). Under TPA the President has the discretion on when to submit the implementing legislation to Congress. President Bush did not submit the legislation because of differences with the Democratic leadership over treatment of autos and beef, among other issues. Early in his Administration, President Obama indicated the need to resolve those issues before he would submit the implementing legislation. On December 3, 2010, after a series of arduous negotiations and missed deadlines, President Obama and President Lee announced that their negotiators reached agreement on modifications in the KORUS FTA, and that they were prepared to move ahead to getting the agreement approved by the respective legislatures. The White House is expected to send implementing legislation to the 112th Congress and that it would like to see Congress approve the agreement by July 1 of this year. The modifications are in the form of changes in phase-out periods for tariffs on autos, a new safeguard provision on autos, and concessions by South Korea on allowing a larger number of U.S. cars into South Korea under U.S. safety standards than was the case under the original KORUS FTA provisions. The issue of full U.S. beef access was not resolved because of the political sensitivity of the issue in South Korea. In 2008, when President Lee reached a separate agreement with the United States to lift South Korea’s ban on U.S. beef imports, massive anti-South Korean government protests forced the two governments to renegotiate its terms. The U.S. beef sector has largely supported the KORUS FTA. A broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the KORUS FTA . With the modifications in the agreement reached in December, this group also includes the three Detroit-based auto manufacturers and the United Auto Workers (UAW) union. It still faces opposition from some labor unions and other groups, including Public Citizen. Many U.S. supporters view passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korean market, while opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough to break down South Korean trade barriers or that the agreement will encourage U.S. companies to move their production offshore at the expense of U.S. workers. Other observers have suggested the outcome of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole, as well as on U.S. Asia policy and U.S. trade policy, particularly in light of an FTA signed in by South Korea and the EU that is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011

The EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the United States

[Excerpt] On October 6,2010, the 27 member European Union (EU) and South Korea signed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). The agreement is expected to go into effect on July 1, 2011, pending approval by the European Parliament and the South Korean National Assembly. If enacted, the South Korea-EU FTA (KOREU FTA) would be the largest FTA in terms of market size that South Korea has entered into. The KOREU FTA reflects the EU and South Korean trade strategies to use FTAs to strengthen economic ties outside their home regions. It also builds upon the surge in trade and investment flows between South Korea and the EU over the past decade. This agreement has possible implications for U.S. trade with South Korea and congressional action on the proposed U.S.-South Korea FTA (KORUS FTA). The proposed KOREU FTA is very comprehensive. It would reduce and eliminate tariffs and other trade barriers in manufactured goods, agricultural products and services and would also cover such trade-related activities as government procurement, intellectual property rights, labor rights and environmental issues. Most studies done on the potential impact of the KOREU FTA estimate that the agreement will have a small but positive effect on the economies of the EU and South Korea as a whole and that the larger relative impact would be on the South Korean economy. The greatest economic impact of the KOREU FTA would be on specific sectors in each economy. EU services providers would be expected to experience gains from the agreement, especially in the areas of retail and wholesale trade, transportation services, financial services, and business services. In terms of trade in goods, EU exporters of pharmaceuticals, auto parts, industrial machinery, electronics parts, and some agricultural goods and processed foods would be expected to gain from the KOREU FTA\u27s implementation. At the same time, South Korean manufacturers of cars, ships, wireless telecommunications devices, chemical products, and imaging equipment would be expected to increase their exports to the EU market. The KOREU FTA is similar to the proposed KORUS FTA in many respects. Both agreements are comprehensive and both would eliminate tariffs on most trade in goods soon after they enter into force. However, they differ in other respects. Phase-out periods for tariffs on some manufactured goods differ. In addition, the KOREU FTA does not cover foreign direct investment. Unlike the KORUS FTA, the KOREU FTA would not allow trade sanctions to be applied where violations of the workers\u27 rights, and environment provisions have been deemed to occur. In addition, the KORUS FTA would cover a broader range of trade in services than would the KOREU FTA. It is not clear whether these differences in the structures of the FTAs would result in appreciable differences in outcomes in terms of economic gains and losses. U.S. and European firms are close competitors in a number of sectors and industries, particularly autos. Some business representatives argue that enactment of the KOREU FTA before enactment of the KORUS FTA would give European competitors commercial first mover advantages, since EU firms, such as those in the auto industry or the services sector, could gain greater market opportunities in South Korea not afforded to US. firms. On the other hand, other factors could also mitigate such advantages. For example, U.S. multinational firms operating in the EU could benefit from the KOREU FTA. Nevertheless, the content and fate of the KOREU FTA could influence the pace and tone of any debate in the United States on the KORUS FTA in the 112th Congress

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Negotiations and Issues for Congress

[Excerpt] The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a potential free trade agreement (FTA) among 11, and perhaps more, countries. The United States and 10 other countries of the Asia-Pacific region— Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam—are negotiating the text of the FTA. Canada and Mexico participated for the first time in the Auckland round of negotiations in December 2012, and Japan recently announced it would seek to participate in the negotiations. With 29 chapters under negotiation, the TPP partners envision the agreement to be “comprehensive and high-standard,” in that they seek to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and agriculture, and to establish rules on a wide range of issues including foreign direct investment and other economic activities. They also strive to create a “21st-century agreement” that addresses new and cross-cutting issues presented by an increasingly globalized economy. The TPP draws congressional interest on a number of fronts. Congress would have to approve implementing legislation for U.S. commitments under the agreement to enter into force. In addition, under long-established executive-legislative practice, the Administration notifies and consults with congressional leaders, before, during, and after trade agreements have been negotiated. Furthermore, the TPP will likely affect a range of sectors and regions of the U.S. economy of direct interest to Members of Congress and could influence the shape and path of U.S. trade policy for the foreseeable future. This report examines the issues related to the proposed TPP, the state and substance of the negotiations (to the degree that the information is publically available), the specific areas under negotiation, the policy and economic contexts in which the TPP would fit, and the issues for Congress that the TPP presents. The report will be revised and updated as events warrant

The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications

On June 30, 2007, United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab and South Korean Foreign Trade Minister Kim Hyung-chong signed the proposed U.S.-South Korean Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. If approved, the KORUS FTA would be the largest FTA that South Korea has signed to date and would be the second largest (next to North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA) in which the United States participates. South Korea is the seventh-largest trading partner of the United States and the United States is South Korea’s third largest trading partner. Various studies conclude that the agreement would increase bilateral trade and investment flows. The final text of the proposed KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have wide economic implications for both the United States and South Korea. The KORUS FTA includes issues on which the two countries achieved early agreement, such as the elimination on tariffs on trade in most manufactured goods and the partial liberalization in services trade. The agreement also includes provisions on a number of very sensitive issues, such as autos, agriculture, and trade remedies, on which agreement was reached only during the final hours of negotiations. If the agreement is to enter into force, Congress will have to approve implementation legislation. The negotiations were conducted under the trade promotion authority (TPA), also called fast-track trade authority, that the Congress granted the President under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). The authority allows the President to enter into trade agreements that receive expedited congressional consideration (no amendments and limited debate). The White House has not indicated when it will send the draft implementing legislation to Congress. (The TPA sets no deadline for the President to do this.) While a broad swath of the U.S. business community supports the agreement, the KORUS FTA faces opposition from some groups, including some auto and steel manufacturers and labor unions. In addition, the agricultural community and some Members of Congress have withheld support for the agreement until South Korea lifts its restrictions on imports of U.S. beef. Some U.S. supporters view passage of the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korea market. Opponents claim that the KORUS FTA does not go far enough in opening up the South Korean market and is a lost opportunity to resolve long running concerns about South Korean barriers. Other observers have suggested the outcome of the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole. Differences between the White House and the Democratic leadership in the Congress over the implications of the KORUS FTA have made the timing and even the likelihood of the President’s submission and the Congress’s subsequent consideration of implementing legislation uncertain. This report will be updated as events warrant

A nucleotide resolution map of Top2-linked DNA breaks in the yeast and human genome

DNA topoisomerases are required to resolve DNA topological stress. Despite this essential role, abortive topoisomerase activity generates aberrant protein-linked DNA breaks, jeopardising genome stability. Here, to understand the genomic distribution and mechanisms underpinning topoisomerase-induced DNA breaks, we map Top2 DNA cleavage with strand-specific nucleotide resolution across the S. cerevisiae and human genomes—and use the meiotic Spo11 protein to validate the broad applicability of this method to explore the role of diverse topoisomerase family members. Our data characterises Mre11-dependent repair in yeast and defines two strikingly different fractions of Top2 activity in humans: tightly localised CTCF-proximal, and broadly distributed transcription-proximal, the latter correlated with gene length and expression. Moreover, single nucleotide accuracy reveals the influence primary DNA sequence has upon Top2 cleavage—distinguishing sites likely to form canonical DNA double-strand breaks (DSBs) from those predisposed to form strand-biased DNA single-strand breaks (SSBs) induced by etoposide (VP16) in vivo

Making Room for Innovation: Using Systematic Random Sampling to Quickly and Efficiently Obtain Shelf Occupancy Data

This poster was peer-reviewed for inclusion at the Association of College and Research Libraries' 2015 Conference in Portland, Oregon. Date of presentation is March 26, 2015.Are you preparing to renovate space currently occupied by the stacks to construct a new cafe? A collaborative learning space? A technology-rich environment? If so, data is needed about the collection. How much shelf space is currently occupied by monographs? By serials? How much is empty? How much space would be available if serials were relocated or withdrawn? Find out how to use systematic random sampling to quickly and efficiently obtain shelf occupancy data